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In recent years infections with carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) have been 
increasing globally and present a major public health challenge.  
Aim 
To review the international literature to: i) describe CPE outbreaks in acute hospital settings globally, 
and ii) identify the control measures used during these outbreaks and report on their effectiveness. 
Methods 
We systematically searched MEDLINE and EMBASE databases, abstract lists for key conferences, 
reference lists of key reviews, and sought information on unpublished outbreaks, for 2000-2015.  Where 
relevant, risk of bias was assessed using the Newcastle-Ottawa scale. We conducted a narrative 
synthesis of the evidence.  
Findings 
Ninety-eight outbreaks were eligible. These occurred worldwide, with 53 reports from Europe. The 
number of cases (CPE infection or colonization) involved in outbreaks varied widely, from 2-803. In the 
vast majority of outbreaks multi-component infection control measures were used, commonly including: 
patient screening, contact precautions (e.g. gowns, gloves), handwashing interventions, staff education 
or monitoring, enhanced environmental cleaning/decontamination, cohorting of patients and/or staff, 
and patient isolation. Seven studies were identified as providing the best available evidence on the 
effectiveness of control measures. These demonstrated that CPE outbreaks can be successfully 
controlled using a range of appropriate, commonly used, infection control measures. However, risk of 
bias was considered relatively high for these studies.  
Conclusion 
Our findings indicate that CPE outbreaks can be controlled using combinations of existing measures. 
However, the quality of the evidence-base is weak and further high-quality research is needed, 
particularly on the effectiveness of individual infection control measures. 
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In recent years infections with carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) have been 
increasing globally1-3. Carbapenem antibiotics are usually reserved for treating serious drug resistant 
infections4, thus the emergence of resistance to this class of antibiotics is a major public health concern. 
Patients infected with CPE have limited treatment options, and high mortality rates (26%–44%, based 
on a recently published review)5. CPE transmission may occur in both healthcare and community 
settings1, 6, 7. Hospitalized patients may be particularly susceptible to infections; CPE is associated with 
increased risks of morbidity and mortality, prolonged hospital stays, and increased healthcare costs8, 9. 
A number of risk factors for CPE acquisition have been identified, including previous hospitalization 
(particularly abroad e.g. in an endemic country), prolonged hospitalization, previous exposure to 
antibiotics, surgery, organ or stem-cell transplantation, critical illness / residency in an intensive care 
unit,  transfer between units, and exposure to invasive/indwelling devices (e.g. catheters)8, 10-14. 
Outbreaks associated with contaminated endoscopic equipment have also been documented15-18. 
The control of CPE in hospital settings is not only costly19 but presents a significant challenge. Reliable 
laboratory detection of CPE is an essential first step but may be hampered since a range of different 
mechanisms can cause resistance, and this may occur to varying degrees; not all laboratories are 
equipped to detect all types of CPE20-22. Meanwhile, asymptomatic CPE-colonized patients may be an 
important source of infection, spreading the bacteria to other patients before they are identified as 
carriers22. These difficulties in the detection of cases, combined with the challenges in treating the 
infection once it is diagnosed, may allow for the rapid dissemination of CPE. Various agencies, 
societies and countries have developed guidelines on CPE control23. These recommend a range of 
control measures including early detection of cases, isolation of patients, patient/staff cohorting, and 
enhanced hygiene measures24. However, evidence on the effectiveness of such measures is lacking, 
as highlighted in a review of measures to prevent the transmission of CPE through cross-border 
transfer of patients conducted by the European Centres for Disease Control (ECDC)25.  
CPE outbreaks occur in acute settings with worrying frequency and there is a need to identify the most 
effective methods of controlling these. We therefore conducted a comprehensive evidence review with 
two main objectives: i) to describe CPE outbreaks in acute hospital settings globally, and ii) to identify 
the control measures used during these outbreaks and report on their effectiveness. 
 
Methods 
Study conduct  
Our review was conducted based on the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions26, and is reported according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and 
Meta-Analyses (PRISMA)27. 
Search strategy 
We carried out electronic database searches in MEDLINE and EMBASE for papers published in the 
English language during 2000-2015 on 5th May 2015. Searches combined MeSH terms and free-text 
key words. Search terms for ‘CPE’ were based on the those used in the ECDC review25. We also 
searched the Cochrane Library together with reference lists of relevant reviews. Abstract lists for 
conferences of the following organisations were searched: Public Health England (PHE), the 
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Healthcare Infection Society (HIS) and Infection Prevention Society (IPS), the European Society of 
Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (ESCMID), the Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), and the Federation of Infection Societies (FIS). To 
obtain information on unpublished outbreaks we searched the Public Health England outbreaks 
database and also requested information on European outbreaks via the ECDC. We imported all 
records into an Endnote database.  
Study selection 
To be eligible for inclusion in the review as a whole, studies had to: i) report on a CPE outbreak in an 
acute setting, and ii) report on the control measures used during the outbreak. Once the final list of 
eligible studies had been selected, we identified a sub-set of studies providing the best available 
evidence on the effectiveness of control measures. The PICO for the sub-study was Patients: patients 
in an acute care setting at potential risk of CPE infection or colonisation in the context of an outbreak, 
Intervention: introduction of (any type of) specific infection control measures, Comparator: 
no introduction of these specific infection control measures (or introduction of less rigorous measures), 
Outcome: measure of the occurrence of CPE colonisations and/or infections (e.g. number, rate). To be 
eligible for inclusion in the sub-set, studies had to: a) utilize a comparator group (e.g. phased 
introduction of control measures enabling comparisons), b) provide sufficient detail on the type and 
timing of infection control measures, and c) quantitatively report on the outcome in the intervention and 
comparator groups.  
For the purpose of this review, an outbreak was defined as two or more cases of CPE infection 
epidemiologically linked in time and place. However, once this definition had been met, to assist in 
differentiating between an outbreak and prevalence data, if the authors described the situation as an 
outbreak or cluster then this was accepted. Studies reporting on CPE infections and/or colonisations 
were eligible, and no restriction was placed on the type of infection control measures used.  In selecting 
studies for inclusion in the review as a whole we included all types of primary studies (e.g. descriptive 
studies, cohort studies, and trials). Literature reviews, expert opinion and guidance documents were not 
eligible for inclusion but the reference lists were used to identify any additional eligible primary studies. 
Although conference abstracts were eligible for inclusion in the review as a whole, they were not 
considered for inclusion in the sub-set of ‘best available evidence’ studies due to limited information. 
Records were independently screened for eligibility by two reviewers with disagreements resolved by 
discussion. Where multiple studies on the same outbreak were identified the most relevant with respect 
to the objectives of the review was selected, and supplemented with additional information from related 
reports.  
Data extraction and definitions 
Key data items on infection control measures used and the effectiveness of these were extracted 
independently by two reviewers. Other basic data items (e.g. country, hospital setting) were extracted 
by one reviewer - 10% of studies were extracted in duplicate and there were no important differences in 
data extracted by different reviewers. The following data items were extracted: lead author and study 
publication date, year in which the outbreak occurred, country, type of hospital setting, brief description 
of the outbreak (e.g. CPE type, source of outbreak, number of cases), description of the outbreak 
control measures implemented, any quantitative or qualitative data on the effectiveness of the outbreak 
control measures, authors conclusions in relation to the effectiveness of control measures. Multi-
component interventions were defined as those utilising two or more infection control measures. The 
term ‘contact precautions’ (or ‘contact isolation precautions’) was assumed to include some kind of 
barrier infection control measure such as the use of gloves/gowns even if not specifically described. 





Data were narratively synthesized as recommended by the University of York Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination28. The vast majority of studies were not designed to assess the effectiveness of infection 
control measures. This, combined with notable heterogeneity between studies, including the range of 
different control measures applied with most studies implementing multi-component measures, meant it 
was not appropriate to conduct a meta-analysis.  
Risk of bias assessments 
Risk of bias was assessed for the sub-set of studies providing the best available evidence on the 
effectiveness of control measures using the Newcastle-Ottawa scale (NOS)29. The NOS assesses bias 
in observational studies related to selection of participants [four items], comparability [one item] and 
outcome [three items]. A study can be awarded a maximum of one star for each item within the 
selection and outcome categories and a maximum of two stars for comparability. Each study was 
independently assessed by two reviewers with disagreements resolved by discussion.  
Results 
Included studies  
The MEDLINE and EMBASE searches returned 1520 records, with a further 13 identified through other 
sources (e.g. hand-searches of abstract lists for relevant conferences); 98 outbreaks were eligible for 
inclusion (Figure 1). Most records were simply outbreak reports describing an outbreak and the 
infection control measures used, with limited information on the extent to which the outbreak was 
controlled. 
Description of CPE outbreaks (Table I) 
CPE outbreaks occurred worldwide, with 53 reports from Europe, 20 from US/Canada, and 9 from 
Israel. Others were from a wide range of countries including Uruguay, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, China and 
India. Klebsiella pneumoniae was the most common organism, being documented as the sole or one of 
the main carbapenem-resistant bacteria present in >80% of outbreaks. A wide range of types of 
outbreaks were apparent, from those affecting a single hospital unit over a period of a few weeks, to 
hospital-wide outbreaks (in some cases affecting more than one hospital) over a period of several 
years. Therefore, the number of cases (CPE infection or colonization) involved in outbreaks varied 
widely, from 2 to 803. Denominators (e.g. number of patients potentially at risk of infection) were often 
not documented and it was therefore not possible to compare attack rates across outbreaks. 
The likely source of the outbreak was not always stated, but where it was documented it was due to an 
index patient with a history of hospitalization abroad in ten outbreaks, a contaminated hospital 
instrument (e.g. duodenoscope) in seven outbreaks, and an environmental reservoir (e.g. hospital sink) 
in four. However, in the majority of outbreaks the source either did not fall into any of these categories 
or was not specified (e.g. the index patient may potentially have been infected during a previous 
hospitalization, in a nursing home or in the community) (n=77).  
 
Measures to control CPE outbreaks (Table II) 
In the vast majority of outbreaks multi-component infection control measures were used. Standard 
procedures were often reviewed and reinforced as an initial step. Patient screening (e.g. all patients on 
the ward, new admissions) was used in 85 of the 98 (87%) outbreaks, use of contact precautions (e.g. 
6 
 
gowns, gloves) in 78 (80%) outbreaks, handwashing interventions (e.g. encouraged or monitored) in 61 
(62%) outbreaks, staff education or monitoring of compliance with interventions in 57 (58%) outbreaks, 
enhanced environmental cleaning/decontamination in 56 (57%) outbreaks (22 of which provided details 
e.g. chemicals used – see Table II), cohorting of patients and/or staff in 52 (53%) outbreaks, and 
patient isolation (e.g. isolation of infected or colonized patients in single rooms) in 51 (52%) outbreaks. 
Less commonly used measures were ‘other’ screening (e.g. environmental) which was used in 35 
(36%) outbreaks, antimicrobial stewardship/ restriction of carbapenem - used in 18 outbreaks, and 
closure of the ward or unit to new admissions – used in 13 outbreaks (although in some additional 
outbreaks temporary restrictions were placed on new admissions).  
Overall, the majority (n=73, (75%)) of these outbreaks were deemed to have been controlled, though 
the time taken to bring them under control varied widely, from a matter of weeks/months to years. In 
nine outbreaks the control measures were deemed insufficient at the time the report was 
prepared/published (e.g. new cases were continuing to occur), and for the remaining 16 outbreaks the 
effectiveness of control measures was unclear (e.g. it was not clearly reported by the authors or in 
some cases CPE became endemic in the setting even if measures helped control the outbreak). The 
timing of outbreak control measures was often not clearly documented. 
Focusing on outbreaks associated with contaminated hospital instruments (n=7), all but one of these 
were due to contaminated endoscopic equipment15, 17, 18, 30-33. In the Carbonne et al 201018 report the 
index patient had been previously hospitalized abroad but seven of the secondary cases were 
associated with a contaminated duodenoscope used to examine the source case. In the remaining 
study the source was a contaminated pre-operative shaving razor34. All outbreaks, except one where no 
information was provided33, were successfully controlled. Generally a range of infection control 
measures were used including review/revision of duodenoscope reprocessing/disinfection procedures. 
Meanwhile, of the four outbreaks likely due to an environmental reservoir, this was a sink/sink drain in 
three35-37, and a contaminated hospital mattress in one38. The latter outbreak was resolved by 
discarding the contaminated mattress. However, eradicating CPE from sink drains tended to be 
problematic. Leitner et al36 reported a prolonged outbreak (~2 years) though it was eventually controlled 
by reinforcing existing infection control measures and replacing all contaminated sinks. Vergara-Lopez 
et al37 also documented a prolonged outbreak (>2 years). The contaminated sink was removed but this 
did not fully stop the occurrence of new cases. The elimination of the horizontal drainage system finally 
eradicated the outbreak. Meanwhile, Kotsanas et al35 reported that attempts at sink sterilisation were 
futile, and the authors suggest that sink removal and replacement with appropriately designed sinks 
may be required.  
Effectiveness of infection control measures during CPE outbreaks   
Seven studies were identified as providing the best available evidence on the effectiveness of control 
measures39-45. Overall, risk of bias was considered relatively high for this sub-set of studies (Table III). 
However, the seven studies tended to score reasonably highly on the selection of the study population 
with four studies39, 40, 42, 44 awarded three stars since the ‘exposed’ and ‘unexposed’ cohorts were 
sufficiently representative and the ascertainment of the exposure (i.e. to infection control interventions) 
was adequate. Three studies41, 43, 45 were awarded the maximum possible four stars because patients 
were screened for CPE on hospital admission in both the intervention and comparator periods thus 
demonstrating that the outcome of interest was not present at start of study. None of the studies 
reported the matching of exposed and non-exposed individuals in the study design or adjusting for 
confounders in the analysis, thus all studies were awarded zero stars for comparability. With regard to 
the assessment of the outcome, all seven studies39-45 were awarded two stars (out of a maximum of 
three); one star because CPE was laboratory confirmed, and one because follow-up was deemed 
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sufficiently long for the outcome to occur. Adequacy of follow-up of cohorts was, however, insufficient in 
all studies. 
The seven studies are summarised in Table IV. Enfield et al44 conducted a before-after intervention 
study with an interrupted time series analysis. They implemented a bundled intervention which included 
staff education, improved hand hygiene, strict isolation, thorough environmental hygiene and 
assessment, and antibiotic stewardship. A reduction in CPE incidence was reported; from 7.77 cases 
per 1,000 patient-days in the 12 months prior to the intervention to 1.22 cases per 1,000 patient-days 
afterwards (p<0.001), though CPE was not completely eliminated. Munoz-Price et al45 report a quasi-
experimental study in which a bundle of interventions was applied involving daily 2% chlorhexidine 
gluconate baths for patients, enhanced environmental cleaning, surveillance cultures at admission, 
serial point prevalence surveillance, isolation precautions, and staff training. There was evidence of a 
reduction in prevalence of colonization with KPC-producing isolates from 21% prior to the intervention 
to 0% at the end of the follow-up period (p<0.001). 
In another quasi-experimental study, Ben-David et al39 introduced an enhanced national infection 
control program in which the key measures were active CPE surveillance and contact precautions for 
all colonized or infected patients. The authors reported a reduction in the incidence of carbapenem-
resistant K. pneumoniae from 6.93 cases per 10,000 patient-days during the last quarter of the pre-
intervention period to 1.8 cases per 10,000 patient-days during the last quarter of the intervention 
period, a 4.7-fold decrease (p<0.001). Borer et al40 conducted a quasi-experimental before-and-after 
interrupted time-series study. The intervention had five key elements: an emergency department 
flagging system, the building of a cohort ward, the eradication of clusters, environmental and personnel 
hand cultures, and a carbapenem-restriction policy. There was an observed decrease in the incidence 
density of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae (CRKP) infections from 5.26 per 10,000 
patient-days in the pre-intervention period to 0.18 per 10,000 patient-days by the end of the intervention 
period (p<0.001). 
Chitnis et al41 utilized a stepwise introduction of infection control measures and used the first stage of 
the intervention (contact precautions, active surveillance, staff education and audits) as the comparator. 
Subsequent interventions involved isolation and cohorting of CPE patients with dedicated nursing staff 
and medical equipment. During the study period, CPE prevalence decreased from 49% to 8% and the 
percentage of patients screened with newly detected CPE from 44% to 0%, both of which were 
statistically significant. Ciobotaro et al42 conducted a quasi-experimental study in which the intervention 
included guidelines for patient isolation, cohorting, and environment cleaning; education of staff; and a 
computerized notification system for flagging CRKP carriers. Poisson segmented regression 
demonstrated a significant difference in slope before and after the intervention (p<0.001). The slope 
showed that during each month after the intervention, the number of CRKP cases decreased by a 
factor of 0.91 (95% CI: 0.85-0.97) compared with the previous month. Finally, Cohen et al43 introduced 
their intervention in consecutive steps and reported that only the cohorting of patients and staff 
(affected patients were admitted to separate areas with dedicated nursing staff and separate medical 
equipment) was associated with a significant change in both the incidence and prevalence of CPE (both 
p<0.00; see Table 4 for slope coefficients associated with each of the four intervention periods).  
Discussion 
Key findings  
This review demonstrates that CPE outbreaks are common and have global impact. Indeed, there is 
growing international concern around the spread of CPE46, 47. Outbreaks were documented in a wide 
range of hospital settings and although many occurred on high-dependency wards (e.g. intensive care 
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units) this was certainly not always the case. Indeed, quite a number were hospital-wide outbreaks. 
Awareness of the risk of CPE throughout acute care settings is therefore important.  
In the majority of outbreaks the source of CPE was unclear or not specified. Seven outbreaks were 
associated with a contaminated hospital instrument (mainly duodenoscopes); there is growing interest 
and concern around such outbreaks48, 49, highlighting the need for thorough reprocessing procedures. 
Meanwhile, although there were only four outbreaks where the source was found to be an 
environmental reservoir, it is of note that ‘other screening’ (which included environmental sampling, staff 
screening etc.) was reported to have been conducted in less than a third of outbreaks. It is therefore 
possible that environmental reservoirs are an under-estimated source of CPE outbreaks, particularly 
those that are prolonged. Infection control practitioners dealing with CPE outbreaks should therefore 
consider whether environmental contamination may play a role. This review highlighted that the 
decontamination of environmental reservoirs such as sink drains is problematic.  
Almost all studies in this review used multi-component infection control measures. That the majority of 
outbreaks were reported to have been ultimately controlled is encouraging and suggests that the 
control measures currently in use can be effective. However, high-quality evidence was lacking and we 
only identified seven studies39-45 meeting our criteria as providing the ‘best available’ evidence. This 
limited evidence supports the use of multi-component measures but it is difficult to disaggregate the 
effectiveness of individual components, or which components are best used together.  
All seven studies reported utilising some kind of active surveillance (e.g. screening all patients on 
admission to a ward, and/or all patients on the ward). It is logical that the early detection of cases may 
be crucial to prevent spread to other patients. There was also evidence suggesting a beneficial effect of 
patient and/or staff cohorting (all seven studies), contact precautions (e.g. gloves) (all seven studies), 
staff education/ensuring optimal compliance40-45, enhanced environmental cleaning/decontamination40-
45, patient isolation40, 43, 45, and handwashing interventions40, 41, 43, 44. It is interesting that only three of 
the seven studies reported using antimicrobial stewardship40, 42, 44 since this may play an important role 
in preventing future outbreaks of drug-resistant infections (not only CPE)50-52. None of the seven studies 
reported closure of the ward/unit/hospital to new admissions, which may perhaps be considered a ‘last 
resort’. Our findings tie in with those of previous evidence reviews on this topic (neither of which were 
restricted to outbreaks)25, 53, and all the aforementioned infection control measures are recommended in 
current guidelines for the control of CPE and other multi-drug resistant gram-negative bacteria54-57.  
The compliance of hospital staff with infection control measures (e.g. use of gowns/gloves, hand 
hygiene) may impact on effectiveness. Indeed, the contaminated hands of healthcare staff likely play a 
key role in the transmission of gram-negative bacteria58, 59, emphasizing the importance of ensuring 
optimal compliance. Although all but one of the seven studies (Ben-David et al 201039) reported 
attempts to enhance staff knowledge/compliance with infection control measures, few reported on 
levels of compliance. Chitnis et al41 documented notable lapses in compliance with hand washing 
precautions which was performed at less than a third of opportunities, though compliance was higher 
for gloves (77%) and gowns (89%). Additionally, Munoz-Price et al45 noted that their experience 
suggested failure to comply with “isolation precautions” was common. An international review of the 
compliance of healthcare staff with infection control interventions found this to be sub-optimal but also 
highlighted that structured interventions can improve compliance60. 
Limitations 
This review did not aim to capture all CPE outbreaks (only those that provided information on the 
control measures used). Therefore, it should not be considered to provide an exhaustive list of all CPE 
outbreaks in acute settings. The reported size of CPE outbreaks varied widely. However, this is likely to 
depend not only on the severity of the outbreak but also on other factors such as the period of 
9 
 
observation, the extent of screening for CPE, and whether only infected patients were considered or 
those that were colonised too.  
Assessing the effectiveness of CPE infection control measures, particularly in the context of an 
outbreak, is subject to some important limitations. Due to the difficulty in detecting CPE in the 
laboratory, under-ascertainment of cases may be an issue during outbreaks. Diagnostic methods for 
the detection of Carbapenem resistance organisms have been evolving, traditional culture based 
methods may be used and molecular methods have also been developed to identify resistance 
mechanisms, however, no single method can detect all carbapenem resistance mechanisms61.This 
may hinder the early recognition of cases and thus the timely initiation of infection control measures 
(e.g. isolation or cohorting of affected patients). The vast majority of reports included in the review as a 
whole were simply outbreak reports and not specifically designed to assess effectiveness of infection 
control measures. As expected, we did not identify any eligible randomized controlled trials. 
Observational studies may be subject to many biases that are difficult to avoid. Indeed, the risk of bias 
in the seven studies providing the best available evidence on the effectiveness of control measures was 
judged as relatively high overall. The findings of these studies should therefore be interpreted with 
some caution.  
There was a lack of clarity around reporting of control measures. The ORION statement (guidelines for 
transparent reporting of outbreak reports and intervention studies of nosocomial infection) recommends 
avoiding the use of terms such “contact or strict isolation, barrier nursing, enteric or skin precautions” to 
describe isolation interventions, as these may not have universal meaning62. Such generic terms were 
frequently used in the outbreak reports included in this review. Furthermore, in some reports control 
measures were mentioned very briefly (e.g.”measures included x y z”) and we therefore can’t be sure 
that all measures used were actually documented. In many cases the ‘standard’ infection control 
measures (i.e. those in place prior to the outbreak) are not adequately described.  
Publication bias may also be an issue. For example, outbreaks that have not been successfully 
controlled may be under-reported in the published literature. However, this is more likely to be a 
concern with regard to general outbreak reports rather than the sub-set of studies specifically designed 
to assess the effectiveness of control measures. We sought information on unpublished outbreaks in 
order to help minimise this potential source of bias; however of those we found none met the eligibility 
criteria for inclusion. 
Conclusions 
CPE is an ongoing and challenging global public health problem. Outbreaks provide an opportunity to 
evaluate control measures to inform future guidelines. Better reporting of CPE outbreaks, in line with 
the ORION statement62 would be helpful. Though many reported CPE outbreaks appear to be 
successfully controlled, optimising the timeliness of control measures and better understanding of which 
control measures are most effective will enable resources to be most wisely allocated and reduce 
transmission. Environmental transmission may play an important part in hospital outbreaks and it 
should be considered. There is an urgent need for further high quality studies to evaluate measures to 
control CPE outbreaks ideally using a staggered approach to the introduction of interventions.  
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CPE type Brief description of outbreak 






KPC-2-Producing Klebsiella oxytoca The index patient was in the medical ICU in December 
2010. The patient was colonized, not infected. The 
patient was then transferred to the haematology ward, 
where contact precautions were continued. KPC-
producing K. oxytoca isolates with resistance patterns 
identical to those of the outbreak strain were identified 
from 10 more patients in the Haematology unit. Three 
patients were identified in late 2011 and 2012, and 
seven were detected from January to July 2013. Six 
patients developed an infection. Investigations revealed 








In the period between June and August 2012, five 
patients were infected and one patient colonised with 
MDR VIM-1-producing E.cloacae. Among all patients 
admitted to the ICU only this one patient was colonised 
after 21 days of hospitalisation, without developing 
clinical infection. Four of the five infected patients died. 
Other or not 
known 





pneumoniae  (KPC) 
The index case detected by routine clinical culture in 
June 2013. The first screening revealed four KPC-
carriers in a 5-bed room and the following rounds four 
KPC-carriers one at a time. None of the other exposed 
patients were positive. None of the KPC carriers 
developed clinical infection within a 6-month follow-up. 
Other or not 
known 




In September/ October 2009 there were 13 cases in total 
(four with infections and nine with digestive tract 
colonisations), including a source case transferred from 
a Greek hospital. Seven were secondary cases 
associated with use of a contaminated duodenoscope 
used to examine the source case and five were 
secondary cases associated with patient-to-patient 
transmission in hospital. 




Cuzon, 201165 2010 France Intensive care 
and internal 
medicine unit 
OXA-48 Klebsiella pneumoniae  Seventeen Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates producing the 
OXA-48 carbapenemase, obtained from 10 patients 
hospitalized from April to June 2010, mostly in the 
medical intensive care unit, were analyzed. Seven 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 









Klebsiella pneumoniae  
Following admission of index case on 2 December 2003 
(transferred from Greece), seven secondary cases 
ensued. 








Klebsiella pneumoniae  
The first case was a pregnant woman who had returned 
from Turkey. Screening of patients (infants and mothers) 
hospitalized in the same unit once a week during the 
following 3 weeks identified a neonate as a carrier of a 
K. pneumoniae isolate that exhibited a similar pattern of 
resistance. 








France Hospital-wide OXA-48 producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae and Citrobacter freundii  
The outbreak period began on 2 May 2013, the 
admission day of the index case, and ended in August 
2014 with 72 secondary cases in three departments. 








The index case was a patient transferred from a Greek 
hospital in June 2010, from whom an isolate with KPC-2-
producing K. pneumoniae was recovered 10 days later. 
By 31st July 2012, 71 further cases (around half were 
infected and half colonised) had been detected. 








OXA-48 Klebsiella pneumoniae  Between December 6, 2012 and January 10, 2013, 
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae (CRKP) was 
cultured from 12 patients staying on 4 different wards. 
There was a spatial relationship between 6 of the cases 
which were located on the same wards. The remaining 6 
cases were all related to endoscopic retrograde 
cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) which was 














After the index case was detected in July 2010, a large 
outbreak evolved with 103 cases became either 
colonised (n=60) or infected (n=43) through to April 
2013. 













CPE type Brief description of outbreak 






Germany Intensive care 
unit 
Klebsiella pneumoniae harbouring 
KPC-2 and VIM-1 
Seven patients were involved in the outbreak. The first 
had CRKP was isolated from their blood. Two weeks 
later two further patients (who were not in the same ICU 
room), were found to have invasive infections with this 
strain. During the next 12 days three further patients 
tested positive for this strain, two of whom were 
colonized only (rectally).  
Other or not 
known 
Wendt, 201058 2008 Germany Surgical 
intensive care 
unit 
KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  In January 2008, a K.pneumoniae was isolated from the 
index patient who was nursed on the interdisciplinary 
ICU. A KPC-2 was identified after K. pneumoniae with 
identical susceptibility patterns had been isolated from 
two more patients. Despite the introduction of infection 
control measures, transmission occurred in five 
additional patients and three of the patients died from 
infections. 
Other or not 
known 
Douka, 201572 2011 Greece Intensive care 
unit 
Pandrug-resistant VIM-1-producing 
Providencia stuartii clonal strain 
The first PDR P. stuartii strain was isolated on 2 
September 2011 from a 74-year-old male patient (index 
case) admitted to the ICU2 17 days previously.  Soon 
afterwards, other cases occurred in the same ICU (10 
patients, including the index case), in the ICU1 (three 
patients) and in the intermediate care unit (two patients). 
All PDR P.stuartii isolates were recovered from cultures 
ordered by the attending physician in the presence of 
signs and symptoms of infection (no surveillance 
cultures were performed during that time period). 









pneumoniae and Enterobacter cloacae 
The outbreak began on February 2011 with four cases 
and reached the maximum on July 2011 with 21 cases.  






Greece Intensive care 
unit 
KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  The outbreak was first noticed in late September 2008 
and all patients found to be colonised or infected with 
KPC-Kp from January 2007 to March 2009 were 
included in the study. From August 2007 to March 2009, 
KPC-Kp was isolated from 53 patients.  











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 




Greece Intensive care 
unit 
Carbepenemase 2 (KPC-2) -producing 
K.pneumoniae  
From January 2007 through December 2008, 50 
patients (34 in the ICU were colonized (n=32) or infected 
(n=18)) 




Greece Hospital-wide NDM-1-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
In total 78 NDM-1-producing K. pneumoniae, which were 
harvested from 71 patients and were implicated in two 
distinct outbreaks. The first extended from November 
2011 to December 2011 and involved four patients in the 
haematology department. The second occurred between 
May 2012 and June 2013 and was ongoing [at the time 
of writing] with a total of 67 patients involved, from whom 
74 NDM-producing K. pneumoniae were harvested.  




Greece Hospital-wide OXA-48-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
From December 2011 to March 2012, 13 K.pneumoniae 
isolates were recovered from nine patients. Index isolate 
K1 was retrieved from a female patient admitted to the 
cardiology intensive care unit on day 18 of 
hospitalization. Patients infected thereafter from other 
wards were at some point of their hospitalization 
transferred either to the cardiology ICU or the general 
ICU or were hospitalized during overlapping periods of 
time in the cardiology ICU with the index patient. 








The first case occurred in May 2007 - the patient had no 
history of hospitalization. Overall, from May 2007 
through May 2008, 23 patients with KPC-producing K. 
pneumoniae infections and available isolates for 
confirmation were identified. 
Other or not 
known 
Morris, 201279 2011 Ireland Two hospitals KPC-2-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
Hospital A: The index case was identified on 6th January 
2011 and an outbreak was declared following a second 
case in the same unit on 24th January. In August 2011 a 
further isolate was detected in a patient from the 
community and in October an additional isolate was 
detected in a patient admitted to a ward implicated in the 
outbreak. Hospital B: In January 2011 carbapenem-
resistant K.pneumoniae was also identified in a patient 
in the ICU of hospital B who had previously self-
discharged from hospital A. One further case was 
identified on screening. 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
Ronayne, 201280 2011 Ireland General 
surgical 
wards 
OXA-48 producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
Between January and October 2011, 13 isolates of 
OXA-48 producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (K. 
pneumoniae) were detected in the laboratory. The first 
five cases were found in clinical specimens of inpatients 
on general surgical wards. 
Other or not 
known 
Schaffer, 201281 2011 Ireland Tertiary care 
hospital 
OXA-48 producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
From January to August 2011, 11 isolates of OXA-48 
K.pneumoniae were detected in one hospital. There 
were 5 cases and 6 carriers.  There was one further 
case identified retrospectively but this case had a 
different typing so was not thought to be related to the 
outbreak.  
Other or not 
known 




The first three isolates were grown from clinical 
specimens taken from patients admitted to the three 
surgical wards in March and April 2011. In total sixteen 
OXA-48-producing K.pneumoniae isolates were 
detected, from both clinical and screening specimens. 
Typing analysis revealed that two outbreak strains were 
circulating in the hospital, one among surgical patients 
and one among medical patients. 
Other or not 
known 




The index patient had been transferred from another 
department 23 days before carbapenem resistant 
K.pneumoniae was identified. 24 KPC-3-Producing 
Klebsiella pneumoniae resistant isolates were recovered 
from 16 patients in the ICU 
Other or not 
known 
Gaibani, 201384 2012 Italy Not specified Citrobacter freundii carrying VIM-1 From June 1 to June 15, 2012, eight isolates of C. 
freundii were isolated from rectal swabs of patients 
hospitalized on a medical ward of a hospital as a result 
of active screening following the detection of a KPC-
positive patient on the same ward. All were colonized. 
Isolates were resistant to all b-lactams, b-lactam/b-
lactamase inhibitor combinations, and imipenem. 
Other or not 
known 
Gaibani, 201485 2010 Italy Hospital-wide Carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
On 8th November, a carbapenems-non susceptible K. 
pneumoniae was isolated from a patient admitted to the 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Susequently, 11 
carbapenems-non-susceptible Enterobacteriaceae have 
been isolated from 11 patients up to 19 days after the 
detection of the index case. Four out of 11 patients were 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
hospitalized in the ICU. 





KPC-Kp ST258 was detected by an active surveillance 
culture programme (in place since June 2009). Between 
18th September and 14th November 2012, KPC-Kp was 
isolated from 10 out of 54 neonates admitted in the 
outbreak period. No cases of infection were recorded. 
Other or not 
known 




Between June and December 2011, 58 colistin-resistant 
K. pneumoniae isolates were recovered from 28 patients 
admitted to different wards, but mainly in the intensive 
care units. All but 6 isolates showed six isolates showed 
carbapenem resistance. 
Other or not 
known 




Between 9 April and 1 September 2009, 13 inpatients 
were colonized or infected.  




2010 Italy Two hospitals Colistin-resistant and carbapenem-
resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae  
Between August and October 2010, a hospital outbreak 
was caused by eight K.pneumoniae isolates from eight 
patients in two hospitals in Catania. A further three 
isolates were obtained from intestinal tract and 
pharyngeal colonization of three patients. 







 KPC-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
During the first two months of the outbreak (Aug -Sep 
2011), with the traditional contact isolation approach, 41 
new cases (23 in first month and 18 in the second) were 
observed. The cases were limited to an average of 8 
cases per month in the following 5 months, after 
activation of the cohorting approach. After the 
restoration of the usual contact isolation measures there 
was a new increase in incidence rates.  
Other or not 
known 
Anesi, 201591 2013 Italy Geriatric ward KPC Klebsiella pneumoniae  The outbreak occurred from August to October 2013. 
Seven were treated for KPC Klebsiella pneumoniae 
infection and seven were found to be asymptomatically 
colonized (based on clinical and screening specimens) 











From December 2009 through December 2010, 59 
patients were infected and 2 colonized by KPC-2-
producing K. pneumoniae. PCR analysis showed a 
cluster of 57 strains. A single case patient, infected at a 
long-term facility, introduced the strain into the hospital.  











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
Mena, 200693 2005 Spain Intensive care 
unit 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae (including 2 cases with 
carbapenem resistance) 
A total of 52 cases of ESBL-producing K.pneumoniae 
were documented in 2005. The outbreak started in 
February and reached its peak during May and June 
with 13 and 12 new cases respectively. In two of the 
patients infected by the epidemic multi-resistant K. 
pneumoniae clone, development of carbapenem 
resistance was documented.  










There were 7 infected and 6 colonised patients admitted 
to the unit between October 2009 and March 2010. The 
outbreak was caused by a single type of clone of ESBL-
producing K.pneumoniae. The outbreak was caused by 
a single type of clone of ESBLKP resistant to all 
quinolones and cephalosporin’s except cefoxitin. In two 
patients it was also found resistance to all carbapenems. 






Spain Intensive care 
unit 






Spain Hospital-wide OXA-48-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
From April 2010 to December 2011, 71 patients were 
identified to have OXA-48 KP in clinically guided 
cultures. Nine were considered to be colonising rather 
than causing infection. The peak incidence occurred in 
March 2011 (12 cases), then the number of incidence 
cases decreased. 









OXA-48 and CTX-M-15 producing 
Klebsiella pneumoniae  
On 7 April 2009, a male (patient 2) was transferred to 
the neurosurgical intensive care unit (SICU) from the 
ICU of a hospital in Morocco. Two days later the first K. 
pneumoniae isolate producing OXA-48 carbapenemase 
was found from a patient in the same SICU (patient 1), 
whereas an OXA-48-producing K. pneumoniae isolate 
from patient 2 (presumably the index case) was not 
detected until 14 April 2009. During the subsequent 
period of time (April 2009 to September 2010), 18 more 
OXA-48-producing K. pneumoniae isolates were 
recovered. 













CPE type Brief description of outbreak 






Spain Hospital-wide KPC-3 carbapenemase-producing 
Klebsiella pneumoniae  
From 16 September 2009 to 28 February 2010 seven 
patients infected or colonised with KPC-3-KP were 
detected. 








During 2009, CNSKP isolates were obtained from 
clinical samples from 55 patients admitted to the ICUs 






Spain Intensive care 
unit 
Multidrug-resistant IMP-8 producing 
Klebsiella oxytoca 
The outbreak occurred from March 2009 to November 
2011 and evolved over four waves. Forty-two patients 
were affected. A contaminated sink drainage system 
was identified as the source of the outbreak. 
Environmental 
reservoir 





The outbreak was detected between 19/10/2013 and 
4/11/2013 in three patients admitted to general and 
digestive surgery unit, who coincided in time and space. 
Active screening detected 63 cases reported by 
30/5/2014: 23 (36%) in clinical sample (only or with a 
rectal swab) and 40 (64%) in rectal swabs. Out of the 
clinical samples, 15 (65%) were classified as nosocomial 
infections, 4 (17.5%) nosocomial colonizations and 4 
(17.5%) extra-hospital infections. Pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis identified one main clone type. 








Not specified Carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae producing OXA-48 and 
CTX-M-15 
The outbreak was linked to a duodenoscope 
contamination. In total, 12 patients were identified as 
carrying a KPCR from December 2010 to July 2011. All 











The outbreak took place in a medical intensive care unit 
between February and April 2013 and three severely ill 
patients were affected. Case 2, who was transferred 
from an Italian hospital, was suspected as the index 
patient. 










Hospital-wide OXA-48 producing Enterobacteriaceae Two cases of K. pneumoniae OXA-48;CTX-M15 
diagnosed in one hospital on 31st May 2011. Outbreak 
investigation ensued. 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 








The index case was a leukaemic patient admitted to the 
hospital. Screening of all patients in the TB-care facility 
where the patient initially stayed revealed another 6 
patients with carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae 
(KPC-Kp). In total 13 other patients proved to be 
colonised with KPC-kp. Environmental cultures also 
yielded KPC-Kp. 
Other or not 
known 





producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  
The index was a patient who had been hospitalized on 
an ICU in Greece and was transferred in July 2013 to a 
pulmonary ward of a large Dutch teaching hospital. 
Despite contact isolation measures according to the 
national guidelines, a secondary case of KPC-KP was 
detected in a pleural fluid of a ward mate. Early August, 
the index patient was discharged to a rehabilitation ward 
of a nursing home (NH). Here, the patient was cared for 
in contact isolation. In November a third case of KPC-KP 
was found in a resident of the same ward as the index 
patient. Active contact screening revealed three other 
(rectal) carriers of KPC-KP. All isolates were resistant to 
carbapenems, colistin and all other groups of antibiotics 
tested. 




Poirel, 2014104 2013 Turkey Hospital-wide Klebsiella pneumoniae producing 
carbapenemases OXA-48, NDM-1 and 
KPC-2, Enterobacter cloacae isolates 
producing NDM-1, and Escherichia coli 
isolates producing OXA-48 
Twenty-two consecutive carbepenem-resistant 
Enterobacterial isolates were recovered from patients 
hospitalized between January and April 2013 in different 
units in the hospital. 









OXA-48 producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
Twenty carbapenem-intermediate or -resistant K. 
pneumoniae isolates were identified from 13 patients 
attending a teaching hospital between January 2008 and 
April 2010. 
Other or not 
known 
Koo, 201232 2010 United 
Kingdom 
Urology unit NDM-1 Klebsiella The outbreak involved 12 patients. The common source 
of infection was rapidly traced to the endoscopic video 











Carbapenem resistant organisms (type 
not specified) 
The outbreak affected seven patients on the unit. 
Spread occurred from August 2012 to June 2013 with 
transmission between patients initially suggested by 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 




overlap in ward stay and later confirmed by plasmid 
sequence analysis of isolates. Currently all but one 
isolate have been associated with colonisation rather 
than infection.  










(Klebsiella pneumoniae & Klebsiella 
oxytoca) 
Identification of a positive patient led to implementation 
of surveillance for CPE with 11 further positive cases 
detected between September to December 2012. 
Other or not 
known 





NDM-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  Five NDM-1–producing K. pneumoniae colonizing and/or 
clinically infecting patients in a community tertiary 
hospital were detected between October and November 
2011 




Canada Tertiary care 
hospital 
NDM-1 producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
There were 9 cases in total. Two index cases carrying 
NDM1-Kp with different PFGE patterns were identified. 
Nosocomial transmission to 7 patients (4 room-mates, 2 
ward mates, and 1 environmental contact) was 
subsequently identified. The index patient for clone 1 
had previously received health care in India. The index 
case for clone 2 had no previous travel to the Indian 
sub-continent 




Chandran, 2012110 2012 Canada Tertiary care 
hospital 
NDM-1 and OXA-48-producing 
Klebsiella pneumoniae  
The index patient had a recent hospital admission in the 
Indian subcontinent. Index patient was placed in a 4-bed 
room upon admission, and 5 other cases ensued. 











KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  Following the death of a patient who was found to have 
KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (blaKPC 
positive), over the subsequent 1 month period (21 March 
2008–20 April 2008) all K. pneumoniae isolates showing 
reduced susceptibility to ertapenem were screened for 
the production of carbapenemases. Seven strains were 
isolated from patients at the hospital, and three from 
patients at different hospitals using the same laboratory. 









Enterobacteriaceae (type not 
specified) 
A total of 49 patients were identified with CPE during the 
study period (April 2009 to September 2011). This was a 
dual outbreak of CPE and extensively drug-resistant 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
Acinetobacter baumannii (XDR-AB). 






Two patients were initially identified with NDM-producing 
CRE during July–August 2012. A third case patient, 
admitted in May, was identified through microbiology 
records review. Surveillance identified 5 additional case 
patients. Of the total 8 patients 3 were infected and 5 
colonized. The outbreak lasted 4 months before 
transmission was controlled.  
Other or not 
known 










Over a 3-week period, the organism was isolated from 
urine cultures on 3 separate patients. Analysis of pulse 
gel electrophesis (PFGE) indicated the same pattern on 
all 3 isolates. Subsequent surveillance cultures were 
obtained on all patients on the unit - 5 additional isolates 
from 3 of the other 7 patients were positive for the 
organism.  
Other or not 
known 







Resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae  
A cluster of five cases of colistin-resistant, carbapenem-
resistant K. pneumoniae was identified from 27 July to 
22 August 2009. All were from clinical cultures; none 
were from surveillance cultures. 









KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  Between 1st January 2009 and 1st January 2010 nine 
patients were either colonised or infected with KPC-
producing K.pneumoniae in a 20-bed surgical intensive 
care unit. Of these, 6 patients died.  









KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  Between 1st January 2008 and 31st December 2008, 11 
patients with positive results on clinical cultures were 
identified; 10 were patients who had KPC-negative 
surveillance culture results at admission. From January 
1, 2008, until the intervention, 8 KPC-positive clinical 
cases—suspected to be due to horizontal 
transmission—were detected. From implementation of 
the intervention through December 31, 2008, only 2 
KPC-positive clinical cases, both in August 2008, were 
detected. 
Other or not 
known 




KPC-2 producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
Between January and April 2005 a total of seven 
patients in the intensive care units at a 500-bed 











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 




community-teaching hospital were noted to have 
K.pneumoniae bacteremia with reduced susceptibility to 
carbapenems. There were no specific rooms or locations 
in the SICU or MICU that were more likely to be 
affected. No breakdown in infection control measures 
has been identified. 
Palmore, 2013117 2011 United 
States 
Hospital-wide KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  From August to December 2011, the National Institutes 
of Health Clinical Center experienced an outbreak of 
carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae infections 
and colonization. The cluster began with the transfer of a 
patient from a New York City facility. Despite isolation 
measures implemented at the beginning of 
hospitalisation, transmission led to KPC-producing 
Klebsiella pneumoniae infections in 8 patients, 6 of 
whom died of infection, and colonization in 9 others. 
Seven months after the putative end of the outbreak, 1 
additional patient acquired the bacteria through 
nosocomial spread and died from infection. 











Over a ten week period six patients on the ICU had 
infections with carbapenem-resistant, non-clonal gram-
negative multi-drug-resistant organisms (namely 
Klebsiella pneumoniae , Citrobacter freundii, 
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, Aeromonas hydrophilia, 
Proteus mirabilis, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and 
Providencia rettgeri. Five of the six patients also had 
simultaneous isolation of vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci (VRE). 
Other or not 
known 







mainly in the 
ICU  
KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  Index patient known to be colonized with carbapenem-
resistant K.pneumoniae was admitted to ICU from 
another Hospital in New York, and discharged on 15 
July. Another case of KPC-K.pneumoniae was observed 
on August 5 cultured from a tracheal aspirate of patient 
2. Both patients isolates belonged to the epidemic ST 
258 K.pneumoniae lineage. Each week thereafter, until 1 
Jan 2012 one new case of colonization or active 
infection with KPC-K.pneumoniae was detected with a 
total of 17 cases.  











CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 








Hospital A is a 206-bed cancer center, and hospital B is 
a 988-bed tertiary hospital. Seven cases of CRKP were 
identified. All 7 patients had endoscopic procedures at 
the same endoscopic center (facility C) within the prior 
60 days. Forty-six of 51 patients who underwent ERCP 
procedures from January 2008 to January 2009 at this 
facility were invited for screening, and an additional 3 
patients colonized with carbapenamse-producing 











In total, 39 case patients were identified during January 
2013 to December 2013, 35 with duodenoscope 
exposure in 1 hospital. NDM-producing Escherichia coli 
was recovered from a reprocessed duodenoscope and 
shared more than 92%similarity to all case patient 












Enterobacteriace (mainly Klebsiella 
pneumonia) 
Ninety-nine CRE transmission cases (34 probable, 65 
possible) were detected from March 1, 2009, through 
February 28, 2011. There were also 16 admission cases 
(from 7 acute care hospitals). 29 CRE bacteraemia 
episodes were identified. 
Other or not 
known 





Not specified Carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriacea (type not specified) 
In 2013, the first CRE case was identified in the 
community. Six additional cases followed. Six out of the 
seven patients were found to be residents of a particular 
skilled nursing facility within a certain timeframe. Only 
one patient was found to be transferred from a 
metropolitan rehab facility to receive care locally. 
Despite the increase in CRE in the community and 
among admitted patients, the hospital maintained zero 
nosocomial CRE cases. 














In late 2008, three patients at a regional cancer 
treatment center were diagnosed with CRKP infection on 
or shortly after admission. Pulse-field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) patterns were identical in the three isolates. All 
three patients had recently received treatment at 
healthcare facilities in a nearby county. Investigations 
revealed a total of 13 cases. Six of the patients had 













CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
from June 2008 to January 2009. The endoscope was 
found to be contaminated - as a result, 46 of 51 patients 
who underwent ERCP procedures from January 2008 to 
January 2009 were tested and this revealed an 
additional three cases. 









Multidrug resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
During a 15 day period in January 2010, 5 patients in the 
unit had clinical cultures positive for a multidrug resistant 
Klebsiella pneumoniae.  All isolates were sensitive to 
imipenem and Polymixin B, had variable susceptibility to 
amikacin and other carbepenems (resistant to 
ertapenem and susceptible or resistant to meropenem), 
and resistant to all other classes of antibiotics. Clinical 
infection was confirmed in 4 of 5 patients (the 5th patient 
was colonized). Eight of nine isolates were genetically 
identical, with one isolate found to be closely related 
strongly suggesting cross-transmission.  
Other or not 
known 
Adler, 2013122 2012 Israel Neonatal 
intensive care 
unit 
OXA-48-producing Enterobacteriaceae Outbreak lasted from March 2012 until the last case of 
CPE carriage identified in December 2012, resulting in a 
total of 57 affected patients, including 16 with invasive 
infections 








Study reports on the highly transmissible and virulent 
carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae (CRKP) 
KPC-3 strain has been spreading in the medical center 
(and in other centers in Israel) since 2006. The total 
number of cases not clearly reported as authors focus 
on changes in incidence overtime. 






MDR Klebsiella pneumoniae  The alarm was raised when a death occurred and two 
cases were infected and reported with MDR Klebsiella 
pneumonia. Screening all admissions from other 
healthcare settings at the time revealed 65% of patients 
colonised with CPE. 
Other or not 
known 
Ben David, 201338 2011-
2012 
Israel Trauma unit Carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
Since 2007 the institution had an active surveillance 
program including rectal surveillance cultures obtained 
from patients hospitalized in intensive-care and step-












CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
discharge. During September 2011 routine screening 
cultures identified 4 patients with carbapenemase-
producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (CRKP) carriage. 
Infection control measures did not prevent continuous 
transmission of CRKP in the ward. Between October 
2011 to February 2012, another 4 patients acquired 
CRKP. An investigation found that all colonized patients 
were nursed on the same mattress. Microbial swabbing 








In 2006, an outbreak of carbapenem-resistant K. 
pneumoniae infection spread throughout the Medical 
Center. Over the three year study period there were 390 
patients with carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae 
colonization or infection. 








A total of 10,680 rectal cultures were performed for 
8,376 patients during May 2006-May 2010; there were 
433 (5.16%) CRKP-colonized and 370 (4.4%) CRKP-
infected patients, respectively 












Israel Tertiary care 
hospital 
Carbapenem-Resistant 
Enterobacteriace (mainly Klebsiella 
pneumonia) 
In 2006, the prevalence of carbapenem-resistant (CR) 
KP isolates in the hospital increased significantly, rapidly 
becoming a major outbreak. During 2006–2007 all 
CRKP isolates at the institution were found to carry the 
blaKPC gene. Approximately 90% of these isolates 
contained the KPC-2 allele and 10% contained the KPC-
3 allele. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) 
revealed one major Xba1 endonuclease-restricted DNA 
profile in 90% of the CRKP isolates. During the study 
period (2008-2009), 229 CRE carriers were identified in 
2008 and 144 in 2009) 
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From January 2006 through August 2010, a total of 
335,703 patients were admitted, of whom 603 patients; 
410 (68%) had in-hospital acquisition and 197 (32%) 
had acquisition prior to hospital admission. 
Other or not 
known 








During March 2010, a cluster of eight CRKPs was 
detected primarily in the adult intensive care unit (ICU). 
In the year between September 2009 and August 2010, 
20 (1.17%) out of 1,706 K. pneumoniae isolates 
detected at the medical facility were CRKP. Two-fifths of 
patients had clinical infection. 
Other or not 
known 




During July 2011 an outbreak of neurosurgical site 
infections with carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella 
pneumonia occurred. The outbreak affected 7 patients. 
Subsequent investigation revealed that a barber’s 







China Hospital-wide IMP-producing Enterobacteriaceae Between November 2010 and September 2012 CPEs 
were isolated from the four distinct orthopaedic patients, 
three patients infected with E. cloacae and one with K. 
oxytoca infection. Four patients had invasive surgical 
procedures. All patients were cured and discharged, 
without outbreak of nosocomial infection caused by 
CPE. Environmental sampling did not detect CPE. 
Other or not 
known 




Between October and December 2011, 27 K. 
pneumoniae isolates were collected from nine patients 
and their different sites and their surrounding 
environment. Multi-locus sequence typing analysis 
indicated all isolates belonged to the ST11 clone.  







Klebsiella pneumoniae  
From February 2003 to June 2004, 456 clinical isolates 
of K.pneumoniae were obtained from patients. Six 
isolates were confirmed as MBL-producing strains. 
Other or not 
known 





Klebsiella pneumoniae  
Seven OXA232 KP and one non-carbapenemase-
producing carbapem-resistant K.pneumonia (non-
CPCRKP) were detected from 9 samples from May 15th 
to July 2013. 













CPE type Brief description of outbreak 




Brazil Hospital-wide Mainly KPC-2 The outbreak began on February 2009 with 19 cases, 
decreased to one case in June 2009 after control 
measures were instigated. On July 2009 there were new 
cases, despite control measures, and there are now 
around 21 new cases each month. The infection is 
becoming endemic in the hospital.  




Brazil Hospital-wide Carbapenem-resistant  Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
During the period from October 2008 to December 2010, 
there were 33 cases of infections caused by 
carbapenem-resistant  Klebsiella pneumoniae. Infections 
were caused by five different genotypes, three of which 
presented a clonal distribution. Genotype B was identical 
to isolates from 11 other hospitals in São Paulo. Sixteen 
of the 33 patients (48%) died during hospitalisation. 
Other or not 
known 




Patients who had a CRPS isolate recovered from April 
2008 (index case) to June 2008 were included in the 
study. In total, 11 isolates from 5 patients were 
recovered during the study period.  




2012 Columbia Neonatal unit NDM-1-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
Six multi-resistant, NDM-1-producing Klebsiella 
pneumoniae strains were recovered from an outbreak 
that affected six neonatal patients 
Other or not 
known 





Twenty-six patients were identified during the outbreak 
period of February through September 2008. 
Other or not 
known 
Ingold, 2012135 2011 Uruguay Intensive care 
unit 
KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae  Four K. pneumoniae isolates were recovered in March 
and April 2011 from two intensive care unit (ICU) 
patients 
Other or not 
known 
Marquez, 2014136 2011 Uruguay Intensive care 
unit 




Australia Tertiary care 
hospital 
Multiple genera of gram-negative 
bacilli carrying the metallo-b-lactamase 
gene blaIMP-4 
The outbreak began in the intensive care unit, with sixty-
two patients had an MBL-producing organism isolated 
from a clinical sample hospital-wide. 




Australia Intensive care 
unit 
Carbapenem resistant 
Enterobacteriacea (several types) 
Four clusters of gram-negative bacteria harbouring the 












CPE type Brief description of outbreak 
Likely source of 
outbreak 
Dandenong Hospital between November 2009 and July 
2012. There were 10 clinical isolates and one screening 
isolate. 







NDM-1-producers, mainly Klebsiella 
pneumoniae  
The outbreak occurred in three private hospitals but the 
paper focusses on just one of these. In early August 
2011 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolated from an 86-year-
old male was found to harbour blaNDM-1. In response, a 
rectal screening programme was instituted to identify 
patients colonised with NDM-1-producers. 














































































































































































































































































































































































    
 
      Since October 2013, no more KPC-









      Authors conclude that the outbreak highlights 
the need for continued surveillance of 
carbapenem resistance, strict 
implementation of a multidisciplinary panel of 











The outbreak was confined to one ward. 
Authors state that up to December 2013, 




    
   
      As of 1 November 2010, no new case 
involving the same strain was identified in 
these seven hospitals. Authors conclude that 
it is possible to limit cross-transmission of 
multidrug-resistant bacteria by healthcare 
workers in a multi-hospital setting by 
implementing systematic investigation and 




    

    

      Not clear but it seems that cases continued 










































































































































































































































































































































































      
  
 
Authors state that systematic screening for 
IR-Kp of all patients admitted to the care 
centre is still maintained to date and no 
secondary IR-Kp case has been detected 
since 2 June 2004. Note that the outbreak 
was only halted after the additional control 
measures were applied. Authors conclude 
that extended control measures are 
adequate to control outbreaks of emerging 
multi-resistant organisms, particularly in 






              Not clear but no further cases are reported Unclear 
Semin-Pelletier, 
201568 




      There was some evidence that triple 
cohorting brought the epidemic under 










  Although the outbreak was partially 
contained, 22 further cases were detected 
after July 2012, the last of which was 
detected in April 2013. The authors state that 
the number of cases could have been 
underestimated by only including isolates 




    
          The outbreak ended after the endoscope 

















































































































































































































































































































































































Authors state that the last case was detected 
in April 2013, and that successful 
containment of the outbreak was related to 
the implementation of an overarching 
concept of infection control 
Yes 
Steinmann, 201171 
      
    

The measures introduced seem to have 
been effective. Peri-anal screening was set 
up as a result of this outbreak and so CPE 






        

The last patient associated with the outbreak 
left the hospital in June and no additional 
cases were detected during the following six 
months. The authors conclude that the 
outbreak was considered to have been 
terminated.  
Yes 
Douka, 201572     
    
    

Authors state that the outbreak was 
ultimately interrupted - no further PDR P. 
stuartii strain was isolated 1 year after 
identification of the last case. However, of 




    
  
          Authors state despite control measures 
today the average of isolated cases is 
around four new cases monthly, becoming 















































































































































































































































































































































































    

Authors conclude that the outbreak seems to 
be getting into an endemic status. Although 
transmission in the ICU seems to be more or 
less controlled, increased admissions of 
unidentified carriers, detection delays until 
cohorting and low nurse-to-patient ratios 






   
  
 
Authors stated that containment of the 
outbreak was due to their measures. 
However, the outbreak was still ongoing at 
the end of the study period. 
No 




    

The authors state that the likelihood of novel 
carbapenemase genes disseminating in 
endemic areas and yet remaining undetected 
due to insufficient molecular epidemiological 
screening is clearly highlighted. Efficient 
identification was achieved with the 
implementation of stricter epidemiological 
surveillance that included collaboration 




        
  The authors conclude that following the initial 
detection and characterization of this clone, 
infection control measures were reinforced 
and no novel OXA-48-possessing isolates 








































































































































































































































































































































































Maltezou, 200978   
 
  
   
  

Authors report that from June 2008 until 
submission of the manuscript, one additional 
case occurred in this hospital. They also note 
that the outbreak extended for more than 12 









Authors conclude that stringent enforcement 
of infection and prevention control and 
antimicrobial stewardship measures appear 
to have been effective in the termination of 















    Following control measures there were two 




       
  

The authors report that the outbreak on 
surgical wards was successfully controlled 
by implementing strict contact precautions 
and rectal surveillance screening on the 
affected wards. The last surgical isolate was 
detected in September 2011 and no further 




    
   
    

The outbreak was ultimately controlled within 
a 4-month period of time, with no novel 








































































































































































































































































































































































detected thereafter. Authors conclude that 
reinforced infection control measures and 
strict monitoring of the staff adherence were 
necessary for the control of the outbreak. 
Gaibani, 201384 

    
 
        

Authors state that early and intensive action 
allowed containment of the cluster and no 
more cases were detected starting from June 
16, 2012. The screening activity was 
continued for an additional 4 weeks, and no 







      

    

During the two months after the outbreak no 
KPC-producers were detected during the 
active surveillance program implemented in 
different wards where infected and colonized 
patients were hospitalized. 
Yes 
Giuffre, 201386 
       
  

On 21st November, only the third colonized 
neonate was still proven to carry KPC-Kp. 
There were no further cases of colonization 
or infection by CRE in the NICU during the 
following seven months. Note, that the 
outbreak was only halted after additional 
measures were applied. 
Yes 
Mammina, 201287       
   
    

Authors state that despite the control 
measures, the outbreak developed further, 
and additional isolates were detected. The 








































































































































































































































































































































































but new cases occurred in the following 
months. In December 2011, three new cases 
were still recognised. 
Mammina, 201088 

    
 














            Authors conclude mortality in this setting was 
lower than that described in the literature. 
Staff cohorting isolation measures may be 
effective to limit the epidemic spread, 
although a periodicity in KPC infections 








    

Authors conclude that the outbreak was 
ultimately controlled within a 3-month period 
of time, with no novel carbapenem-resistant 








    

Authors state that before the introduction of 
control program 9-11 patients/month were 
infected by KPC-2-producing K. 
pneumoniae. After the application of the 
control program a reduction of KPC-2-
producing isolates was observed: in October 
10 patients, in November 3 patients, in 









































































































































































































































































































































































   
            The outbreak was still not considered to be 
under control by the end of 2005 as new 





    
  

      The authors conclude that the death rate for 
this outbreak was low (1 patient) and that 
infection control measures helped to 






   
    

The outbreak was controlled in October 2012 
and the authors conclude that isolation 
measures, exclusive personal hygiene, 
proper treatment and selective digestive 







    
  
 
The authors state that to date, OXA-48 KP-
infected/colonised patients continue to be 
identified. In spite of the duration and the 
widespread distribution of the cases, they 
believe that this set of cases represents a 
cluster of outbreaks associated with an 
outbreak of a major high-risk clone rather 
than an endemic situation, encouraging 
current efforts to intensify surveillance and 













































































































































































































































































































































































      Authors conclude that the implementation of 
control measures led to the successful 
control of the outbreak.  
Yes 
Robustillo Rodela, 
201298   
  
  
    

After implementing the control measures, no 










    

Incidence rate lowered from 16.1 and 
6.1/1,000 patient days (SICU and MICU) to 
4.4/1,000 patient days.  Specific 
interventions were highlighted as being 
effective for a short period after they were 
implemented but could not be sustained 
because of cost. 
Unclear 
Vergara-Lopez, 
201337       
  
 
The authors felt that the elimination of the 





      

        





    
  
      Authors state that rapid identification of 
outbreak cases and their source followed by 
implementation of strict infection control 
measures stopped the appearance of new 












































































































































































































































































































































































    
    









    

No nosocomial transmission of 
Enterobacteriaceae OXA-48 was detected 
after 18 July 2011. The last presumed 
outbreak-related KP OXA-48 was detected in 
April 2012. Authors conclude that their 
findings suggest that contact isolation 
measures using single rooms with individual 




   
  

        Authors concluded that strict infection control 
measures are effective. 
Yes 
Weterings, 2014103 
    
  

      Authors state that this pan-resistant KPC-KP 
spread repeatedly despite isolation 
measures. The outbreak was controlled by 
separating the KPC-KP positive residents in 
a separate building and by providing 




    

        

After 30 to 45 days, there were no patients in 
the NICU who were infected or colonized 
with any CRE organism, and there has not 








The authors feel the measures contributed to 










































































































































































































































































































































































      

      

Authors report that the measures taken 
successfully halted the outbreak. They also 
note that all infected patients and potentially 
exposed patients remain under close 
microbiological surveillance, and there have 























        Authors conclude that standard infection 
control practices, including active screening 





    
  
    

Authors conclude that the implementation of 
infection control precautions contributed to 
the interruption of subsequent spread of the 
organism with no further transmission of 















          Authors state that after enhanced infection 
control practices were implemented, the 
outbreak was brought under control, with 








































































































































































































































































































































































after early April 2008. They conclude that 
active surveillance and enhanced infection 




   
  
 
Incidence rate (IR) of CPE for the 12 months 
before the implementation of enhanced 
measures was 7.77 cases per 1,000 patient-
days, and decreased to 1.22 cases per 1,000 








    

Authors state that timely surveillance 
cultures, combined with targeted infection 





        
 
    

The bi-weekly surveillance did not identify 








    

Authors state that no further cases of colstin-
resistant carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella 
pneumoniae were identified. 
Yes 
Munoz-Price, 
2010a115      
      

Authors conclude that the bundle of 
interventions successfully controlled the 




     
      

Authors conclude a bundled intervention was 
successful in preventing horizontal spread of 
KPC-producing K.pneumoniae in a long-term 
acute care hospital, despite ongoing 

















































































































































































































































































































































































  It was concluded that infection control 
strategies were eventually successful in 
curbing the outbreak in April 2005. 
Yes 
Palmore, 2013117 
      
    

Authors conclude that the strategy and 
associated improvement in hand hygiene 
and adherence to infection control 
precautions, led to conclusion of the 
outbreak. They believe that implementing 
infection control precautions that have been 
recommended by CDC, such as hand 
hygiene, cohorting, and active surveillance, 
most likely contributed the most, and 
remediation of environmental contamination 









    

Two-months after the super-isolation 
procedures and all six patients had been 
discharged there were no new cases of 
multi-drug resistant infections. 
Yes 
Snitkin, 2012119 
      
    

The authors feel that the outbreak was 
ultimately controlled by the strict IC 
measures. 
Yes 
Alrabaa,  201317 
 
    
  
    

Authors state that they report early 










































































































































































































































































































































































      

        Authors state that no new patients with 
duodenoscope-associated NDM were 
identified among patients who only had a 
procedure with a duodenoscope following 




    
   
    

During the study period significant reductions 
were observed in CRE prevalence (49% vs 
8%) and the percentage of patients screened 






          






              

No information. Unclear 
Preas, 2011121         
  
      Heightened attention to hand hygiene, 
environmental cleaning and the disinfection 
of reusable patient care equipment were 
critical control measures in preventing further 
MDRKP transmission without the need for 









During the first week of the intervention, 8 
new cases were identified in the NICU (7 
surveillance, 1 clinical). Two additional new 
carriers were identified in the next month 
who were all previously exposed. Incidence 








































































































































































































































































































































































first 4 months, followed by no new cases in 
the next 3 months. Authors conclude that 
while standard infection control measures 
are effective for initial containment, 
continuous vigilant monitoring is essential in 
order to detect and respond to a resurgence 
of the outbreak. 
Ciobotaro, 201142 

    
  
   
  
The incidence of CRKP decreased by 16-fold 
(P <0.001), and this decrease was sustained 
for 30 months. The rate of cross-infection 
decreased from 6% during 2007-2008 to 
2.7% in 2009-2010 (P<0.05). Authors 
conclude that a comprehensive infection 
control program can contain an outbreak of 
the CRKP KPC-3 strain in acute care 





    
  
    

A downward trend of positive screening 
results over time reflected the efficacy of 
measures and new cases were screened on 
admission systematically and followed up 
accordingly. The authors conclude that a 
multidisciplinary effort supported by 
management and effective communication 








































































































































































































































































































































































Ben David, 201338 
  
              Authors state that after discarding the 
damaged mattresses, a significant decrease 
in acquisition rate in the ward was observed, 





      

          The incidence of clinical infection with 
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae has 
decreased 4.7-fold, from 6.93 cases per 
10,000 patient-days during the last quarter of 
the pre-intervention period to 1.8 cases per 
10,000 patient-days during the last quarter of 





    
  
 
From May 2006 through April 2007 (pre-
intervention), the CRKP-infection incidence 
density per 10,000 patient-days was 5.26. 
After the intervention, the incidence density 
was reduced to2.91 in December 2007, 
followed by 1.91, 1.28, and 0.18 in 2008, 
2009, and January-May 2010, respectively. 
No nosocomial CRKP infections were 







      
 
A significant reduction in the incidence of 
new carriers from 77 in 2007 to 12 in 2008 
was observed. Authors conclude that strict 
isolation precautions enforced at the 
institutional level and organization of 








































































































































































































































































































































































professions involved in patient care can 
contain an outbreak in an acute care hospital 
even in an endemic country. 
Geffen, 2010125 

      

          The proportion of screened patients with 
CPE carriage decreased during the study 
period - from 11.6% in 2008 to 7.4% in 2009. 
Authors conclude that the implementation of 
a rapid, reliable CRE screening programme, 
combined with strict isolation precautions, 
successfully reduced the incidence rate of 





    
    

Authors conclude that cohorting of patients 
with dedicated staff, combined with 
implementation of focused active 
surveillance, effectively terminated the 





   
    

Authors conclude that reinforcing infection 
control measures together with contact 
isolation of patients colonized or infected 
with CRKP were successful in controlling the 
outbreak, but did not prevent endemicity. 
Yes 
Dai, 201434 
             After institution of infection control measures, 









































































































































































































































































































































































    
  

    

Ultimately, all patients were cured and 
discharged. The authors conclude that the 
results underscore the importance of strict 
infection control measures to limit 
dissemination. In addition, reasonable 
support for treatment and disinfection 
protection seemed to be more effective for 





                Authors state that over a period of almost 10 
months no further CPE were isolated. 
Yes 






  Since June 2004, ceftazidime-resistant 
K.pneumoniae has not been isolated from 
the ward which housed patients with MBL-








    Authors state that no further cases were 
identified to date. 
Yes 
Carrilho, 2011131     
  
    

    Following an initial decline to just one case in 
June 2009, control measures were not 
sufficient to control CPE which is becoming 












































































































































































































































































































































































          The introduction of new clones on different 
occasions led to patient-to-patient spread 
and caused additional control measures to 
be necessary. The control measures were 
adopted to avoid an outbreak, but authors 
state that several introductions of new strains 
coming from other hospitals may have made 
control difficult. The authors also state that 
genotype B seems to have caused a state-
wide spread and has persisted in their 






        The authors report that the outbreak was 
small, had a short duration, and was 
interrupted <3 months after the index case 
identification, only with the adoption of 





    
    
  

Authors state that measures instigated 
controlled the spread of the identified clone. 
No new cases were found in the unit during 




    
 
  
   
Authors conclude that once staff initiated 
active surveillance, cohorted patients, and 
placed them in contact precautions, they 






















































































































































































































































































































































































     
  

Five months after the identification of the two 
case patients two colonized cases were 
detected. Authors state that similar control 
measures were applied, surveillance cultures 
were performed during the next 6 months 
and no more cases have been identified 
since then. 
Yes 






Authors note that there was a hospital-wide 
decline in the prevalence of MBL-producing 
organisms, and state that the use of gloves, 
gowns, and improved compliance with hand 
gel use probably limited cross-transmission 
between patients. However, 6 new cases of 
infection were identified in ICU in the 8 




      

        Authors conclude that attempts at sink 
sterilisation were futile, and complete 
eradication will require future sink removal 
and replacement with appropriately designed 
sinks. 
No 




    

    

Authors conclude that controlling the 
outbreak was resource intensive and 
demanded a concerted effort from all role-
players, with critical review of the outbreak 
situation and re-evaluation of interventional 
strategies throughout. Although sporadic 








































































































































































































































































































































































1-producers continue to be reported, no 
clusters or epidemiologically-linked cases 
have been identified since the end of the 
outbreak. 
Total 85 35 51 52 78 56 61 13 18 57   
*Includes all control measures reported to have been used (including any that may have been in place prior to the outbreak, if documented) 
Details on enhanced cleaning procedures (e.g. types of chemicals used) are provided in the original paper
61 
 



































































































Selection category        
Representativeness of the exposed cohort * * * * * * * 
Selection of the non-exposed cohort * * * * * * * 
Ascertainment of exposures * * * * * * * 
Outcome of interest not present at start of study 
 
* 
   
* * 
Total stars for selection category *** **** *** *** *** **** **** 
Comparability category 
       Cohort comparability based on design or analysis 
       Total stars for comparability category               
Outcome category 
       Assessment of outcome * * * * * * * 
Follow-up long enough for outcomes to occur * * * * * * * 
Adequacy of follow-up of cohorts 
       Total stars for outcome category ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 










Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 











Infection control measures described 
in the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) 2012 CPE 
toolkit were instigated. Before the 
intervention, routine infection control 
measures for patients with CPE 
included standard precautions (hand 
hygiene before and after patient 
care) and contact precautions (gown 
and glove barrier precautions). In 
addition, healthcare provider and 
patient education regarding CPE 
was provided, and the CPE status 
was marked in the electronic 
medical record. Rooms were 
cleaned with a quaternary 
ammonium compound, and all 
disposable items, curtains, and 
linens were removed after patient 
transfers.  
The intervention included the following 
bundled interventions: weekly 
education and status update meetings, 
hand hygiene and contact isolation 
reinforced through signage and 
incorporation into ongoing quality 
efforts (e.g. patient care rounds), 
patients with CPE were cohorted in 
adjacent rooms, nursing and 
respiratory care were cohorted, daily 
patient baths using 2% chlorhexidine 
gluconate wipes were initiated, and 
pre-emptive contact isolation was used 
until a patient was proven not to be 
colonized with CPE or extensively 
drug-resistant Acinetobacter baumanni 
(XDR-AB) through surveillance 
cultures. Carbapenem antibiotics 
became restricted on the hospital 
formulary. All rooms underwent 
terminal cleaning within 48 hours of 
implementation of the intervention and 
whenever a patient with CPE or XDR-
AB was discharged from the unit. 
Environmental services and nursing 
created a shared worklist defining 
responsibility for daily cleaning of all 
items in patient care rooms. Use of 
appropriate disinfectants with the 
manufacturers’ recommended contact 
dwell times was reinforced. To assess 
the quality of environmental cleaning, 
adenosine tri-phosphate (ATP) 
bioluminescence testing was 
performed. Hand hygiene compliance 
was measured through a covert 
observation program that has been 
used in the setting since 2006.  
Incidence rate of CPE Incidence rate (IR) of 




was 7.77 cases per 
1,000 patient-days 
IR was 1.22 cases 
per 1,000 patient-
days after the 
intervention 
Test for trend over 
time: p=0.001. No 
degradation of this 
decrease was 
observed over the 












Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 









Not documented aside from a 
baseline point prevalence 
surveillance 
The infection control bundle covered: 
decolonization of patients’ skin (with 
daily chlorohexidine baths), improved 
cleaning of environmental surfaces, 
identification of carriers of KPC-
producing strains (with admission and 
surveillance cultures), isolation and 
contact precautions (pre-emptive 
contact precautions and cohorting of 
high-risk patients at admission and on 
the basis of the results of clinical or 
surveillance cultures), personnel 
education, and environmental cultures. 
Point prevalence surveys were also 
conducted. 
Point prevalence of 
rectal carriage of KPC-
producing strains and 
occurrence of CPE 
colonisations and 




month before start of 
the intervention) 
showed a prevalence 
of colonization with 
KPC-producing 
isolates of 21% (8 of 
39 
patients screened). 
From 1st January 
2008, until the 
intervention, 8 KPC-
positive clinical 
cases were detected. 
Prevalence of 
colonisations at 




were: 12%, 5%, 3%, 
0% and 0%. From 
implementation of 
the intervention to 
31st December 
2008, only 2 KPC-
positive clinical 
cases were detected 
Rectal carriage of 
KPC-producing 
strains was found 
at a decreasing 
rate over the 










Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 








During the pre-intervention period 
(January 2006 through May 2007) 
contact precautions were 
implemented for the management of 
patients with clinical isolates of 
carbapenem-resistant K. 
pneumoniae. Detection of 
carbapenem-resistant K. 
pneumoniae was based on culture of 
clinical samples only. 
For the intervention (June 2007 
through December 2008), an 
enhanced national infection control 
program was added to the baseline 
protocol (May 2007), the national 
programme included:  contact 
precautions for the care of all patients 
with carbapenem-resistant K. 
pneumoniae colonization or infection; 
the prevalence of colonization or 
infection was reported daily, and this 
information was mailed to the hospital 
management and the national 
coordinator; and patients infected with 
carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae 
had their names entered into a 
database so that they could be 
identified at hospital readmission. In 
addition to the measures taken in 
accordance with the national infection 
control program, an 
active surveillance program was 
initiated and included obtaining rectal 
culture samples from patients 
hospitalized in intensive care units and 
in step-down units, at admission to the 
unit and once weekly until the patient 
was discharged. In other departments, 
surveillance culture 
samples were only obtained from 
patients with epidemiologic links to 
persons from whom a carbapenem-
resistant K. pneumoniae isolate had 
been recovered. 




Incidence was 6.93 
cases per 10,000 
patient-days during 
the last quarter of the 
pre-intervention period  
Incidence was  1.8 
cases per 10,000 
patient-days during 











used to assess the 
change in the 
number of cases 
of infection per 
10,000 patient-
days over time, 
before and after 
the intervention. 
The change in 
slope was from 














Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 












Retrospectively, all relevant data 
were collected from the medical 
records of patients with CRKP 
infections from May 2006 through 
April 2007, the pre-intervention 
period. Details of pre-intervention 
measures not specified 
From May 1, 2007, through May 1, 
2010, the post-intervention period, the 
intervention was applied and 
prospectively followed. The five key 
elements of the intervention were: 1a) 
an emergency department flagging 
system of high risk patients. 1b) On 
admission these flagged, high-risk 
patients were placed in pre-emptive 
isolation pending culture results and 
rectal cultures for CRKP performed for 
all patients. Strict contact precautions; 
signage; 1:4 ratio of trained nurses to 
patients and a dedicated 
housekeeping team. 2) CRKP-positive 
patients cohorted together on a 
separate ward or area. The building of 
a cohort ward (involved strict isolation; 
dedicated nursing staff and equipment, 
including an X-ray machine and 
monitors; visitor education; and 
environmental disinfection(details 
given)), 3) intensive active surveillance 
in high-risk wards (included 
surveillance cultures performed at 
admission, weekly there-after, and at 
discharge; CRKP-positive ICU patients 
placed in private rooms or the cohort 
ward when stable), 4) epidemiological 
investigations (included identification 
of new CRKP patients within the 
hospital; immediate and intensive 
review of case and contacts by the 
infection control practitioner; rectal 
surveillance cultures; enforcement of 
compliance with hand hygiene, contact 
precautions, and disinfection 
protocols), 5) new carbapenem-
restriction policy 
Incidence of newly 
diagnosed CRKP 
infections per 10,000 
patient-days 
From May 2006 
through April 2007 
(pre-intervention), 
incidence density was 





was reduced to 2.91 
in December 2007, 
followed by 1.91, 
1.28, and 0.18 in 





with 0.18 per 
10,000 patient-
days. Changes in 
hospital-wide 
monthly incidence 
of infection:  slope 
12 months before 
intervention: 
p<0.002 (CI: -
0.032 to 0.001); 
change in slope: 
p=0.004 (CI: -
0.204, -0.040), 











Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 










Stepwise introduction of the 
intervention with the first intervention 
period (starting July 2010) used as 
the comparator: Beginning in 
January 2010, all patients were 
presumptively placed under contact 
precautions upon admission and had 
urine and sputum surveillance 
cultures collected within 3 days of 
admission to screen for multi-drug 
resistant organisms (MDROs), 
including CRE. Patients with a 
history of or who tested positive for 
an MDRO remained under contact 
precautions for their entire 
hospitalization. Rectal screening for 
all patients began in July 2010 and a 
point-prevalence survey was 
conducted. As part of the on-site 
epidemiologic investigation 
conducted in March 2011, more than 
40 hours of infection prevention 
observations of healthcare 
personnel (HCP) were conducted.  A 
stepwise process of implementing 
infection prevention measures was 
initiated on the basis of results of 
biweekly CRE point-prevalence 
surveys and observations: 1) 
Beginning in July 2010, addition of 
audits of glove and gown use to 
ongoing weekly hand hygiene 
audits, monthly educational sessions 
on proper hand hygiene and 
isolation precautions for all HCP, 
and weekly reminders on 
appropriate cleaning practices for 
high-touch surfaces to 
environmental services staff.  
Subsequent stages of the intervention: 
2) Starting in December 2010, CRE 
patients were cohorted and spatially 
separated from non-CRE patients into 
one section of a medical-surgical unit 
with dedicated nursing staff. Daily staff 
meetings were conducted to increase 
facility communication about CRE 
prevention efforts. 3) In March 2011, 
additional recommendations from the 
on-site investigation were 
implemented, including daily audits of 
hand hygiene and PPE use, 
observations of insertion and 
maintenance practices for invasive 
devices, and daily assessments of the 
need for invasive devices, especially 
urinary catheters. Biweekly conference 
calls with local and state health 
departments, and the CDC were 
initiated in April 2011 to discuss results 
of ongoing point-prevalence surveys, 
to optimize infection prevention efforts 
at the facility, and to discuss regional 
CRE prevention efforts in healthcare 
facilities. Additional measures 
implemented included dedicating 
shared medical equipment (i.e. hover 
lifts, scales, and blood pressure 
machines) to CRE patients and 
assigning dedicated nursing staff to 
CRE patients in the intensive care unit 
(ICU). The facility also began a 
campaign to reduce unnecessary 
urinary catheter use concurrently with 
CRE-specific measures 
CPE prevalence and 
the percentage of 
patients screened with 
newly detected CPE 
CPE prevalence: 49%; 
percentage of patients 
screened with newly 
detected CPE: 44% 
CPE prevalence: 
8%; percentage of 
patients screened 
with newly detected 
CPE: 0% 
Trends in overall 
CRE prevalence 







weighted for the 
number of patients 
in the facility and 
the number of 
patients screened 






reduction in CPE 
prevalence and 
























Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 








Details of pre-intervention measures 
not specified. Pre-intervention period 
from January 2006 to January 2007. 
The intervention (introduced February 
2007) involved 3 key elements: 1) 
guidelines for patient isolation and 
cohorting, environmental cleaning, and 
screening (included cohorting of 
clinical cases and carriers; dedicated 
nursing personnel; strict contact 
precautions; detailed instructions for 
cleaning and disinfecting CRKP-
positive patients’ units were provided 
to all housekeeping staff; some CRKP 
carriers were transferred to the long-
term care facility branch in an attempt 
to minimize the prevalence of 
hospitalized CRKP carriers;  2) 
education and training (including 
instruction sheets for staff, patients 
and caregivers; lectures; monitoring of 
compliance with recommendations; 
importance of data sharing was 
emphazised; hospital physicians were 
educated regarding the importance of 
restricting the use of broad-spectrum 
antibiotics;  database on CRKP 
incidence and active surveillance was 
created), 3) automatic instructions and 
CRKP alerts (included immediate 
laboratory notification of any new 
CRKP isolation to both the infection 
control unit and the patient’s ward; 
expanded active surveillance with 
computerised system for identifying 






No clinical cases of 
CRKP were recorded 
in the first quarter of 
2006. Between May 
and December 2006, 
the CRKP incidence 
was 3.4/10,000 
patient- 
days.  During the first 
months of 2007, the 





of clinical CRKP 
cases declined from 
6.6/10,000 
patient-days in the 
first 5 months of 
2007 to 2.5/ 
10,000 patient-days 
in the last 7 months 
of 2007. 
From January 2008  
up to the end of the 
study, the average 
incidence was 
0.5/10,000 patient-
days, which was 
16-fold lower than 






difference in slope 
before and after 
the intervention 
(p<0.001). The 
slope showed that 
during each month 
after the 
intervention, the 
number of CRKP 
cases decreased 
by a factor of 0.91 
(95% CI: 0.85-
0.97) compared 









Control measures used in 
comparator group 





(e.g. CPE rate or 
number of cases) 
Outcome in 
intervention group 
(e.g. CPE rate or 








Details of pre-intervention measures 
not specified. The first stage of the 
intervention was used as the 
comparator. Intervention 1 (began 
March 2006): isolation for patients 
colonized or infected with CRKP in 
single rooms (where possible) and 
contact precautions 
Intervention 2 (began March 2007): 
Cohorting of patients and nursing staff, 
screening of patients in the same room 
as newly identified carriers of CRKP 
(“snow ball” active surveillance), local 
protocol for continued cohorting of 
returning patients, and environmental 
cleaning of the cohort areas performed 
daily according to a checklist; 
Intervention 3 (began August 2008): 
Weekly active surveillance in the 
intensive care unit; Intervention 4 
(began March 2009): Selective 
surveillance of patients on admission 
to the emergency department 
CRKP incidence (total 
number of cases of in-
hospital CRKP 
acquisition detected 
by clinical cultures - 
each patient was only 
counted once) and 
prevalence (included 
both clinical and 
surveillance cultures 
and was calculated on 




reported as cases per 
1,000 hospital beds 
During intervention 
period 1: mean 
incidence 8.4 cases 
per 1,000 hospital 
beds (slope 
coefficient: 1.9),  mean 
prevalence 10.4 cases 
per 1,000 (slope 
coefficient: 2.0)  
Intervention period 
2: mean incidence 
13.4 cases per 
1,000 hospital beds 
(slope coefficient: -























intervention 2, the 
cohorting 
intervention, was 
associated with a 
significant change 
in both the 
incidence 










Figure 1. Study selection flow chart 
 
 
Sift at title/abstract 
(n=963) 
Records identified via MEDLINE 
and EMBASE searches  
(n=1520) 
Duplicates removed (n=557) 
Reject at title/abstract 
(n=824) 
Sift at full text 
(n=139) 
Include in the review as a whole  
 (n=98) 
Reject at full text (n=54) 
Lacking sufficient 
information on infection 
control measures (n=37) 
Not an outbreak (n=8) 
Not CPE (other type of 
resistance) (n=2) 
Linked to an eligible report 
on same outbreak (n=7) 
Records identified from 
other sources (e.g. hand-
searches of key conference 
abstracts) (n=13) 
Include in sub-set of studies 
identified as providing best 
evidence on effectiveness of 





Search 1 - Medline and Medline in-process citations, January 2000 to May 2015 
 
1. carbapenemase/ or carbapenemase$.ti,ab,ot. 
2. ((carbapenem$ or klebsiella) adj3 (produc$ or secret$ or resist$ or emit$ or generat$ or block$ or 
immun$ or antagoni$ or "not susceptib$" or unsusceptib$ or un-susceptib$ or non-suscepti$ or non-
suscepti$)).ti,ab,ot,hw. 
3. (kpc or vim or mbl or oxa or oxacillinase or oxa48 or metallo-beta-lactamase or "metallo-b-lactamase" 
or NDM$).ti,ab,ot. 
4. or/1-3 
5. enterobacteriaceae/ or exp citrobacter/ or exp enterobacter/ or exp escherichia/ or exp hafnia/ or exp 
klebsiella/ or exp kluyvera/ or exp morganella/ or exp proteus/ or exp providencia/ or exp serratia/ 
6. enterobacteriaceae infection/ or exp escherichia coli infection/ or exp klebsiella infection/ or exp 
proteus infection/ or exp serratia infection/ 
7. (enterobacter$ or entero-bacter$ or klebsiella or citro-bact$ or citrobact$ or escherichia or hafnia or 
morganell$ or proteus or serratia or "e coli" or "e.coli").ti,ab,ot. 
8. (kluyvera or providencia or "E.aerogenes" or "e aerogenes" or "k.oxytoca" or "k oxytoca" or "k 
pneumonia$" or "k.pneumonia$" or "e cloacae" or "e.cloacae").ti,ab,ot. 
9. or/5-8 
10. 4 and 9 
11. (CPE or CPEs or CRE or CREs or CNSE).ti,ab,ot. 
12. 10 or 11 
13. ((CP or CR) adj2 (enterobacter$ or entero-bacter$)).ti,ab,ot. 
14. 12 or 13 
15. (outbreak or cluster).mp.  
16. 14 and 15 
17. (2000$ or 2001$ or 2002$ or 2003$ or 2004$ or 2005$ or 2006$ or 2007$ or 2008$ or 2009$ or 
2010$ or 2011$ or 2012$ or 2013$ or 2014$ or 2015$).dd. 
18. 16 and 17 
19. (2000$ or 2001$ or 2002$ or 2003$ or 2004$ or 2005$ or 2006$ or 2007$ or 2008$ or 2009$ or 
2010$ or 2011$ or 2012$ or 2013$ or 2014$ or 2015$).em. 
20. 16 and 19 
21. 18 or 20 
22. carbapenemase/ or carbapenemase$.ti,ab,ot. 
23. ((carbapenem$ or klebsiella) adj3 (produc$ or secret$ or resist$ or emit$ or generat$ or block$ or 
immun$ or antagoni$ or "not susceptib$" or unsusceptib$ or un-susceptib$ or non-suscepti$ or non-
suscepti$)).ti,ab,ot,hw. 
24. (kpc or vim or mbl or oxa or oxacillinase or oxa48 or metallo-beta-lactamase or "metallo-b-
lactamase" or NDM$).ti,ab,ot. 
25. or/22-24 
26. enterobacteriaceae/ or exp citrobacter/ or exp enterobacter/ or exp escherichia/ or exp hafnia/ or 
exp klebsiella/ or exp kluyvera/ or exp morganella/ or exp proteus/ or exp providencia/ or exp serratia/ 
27. enterobacteriaceae infection/ or exp escherichia coli infection/ or exp klebsiella infection/ or exp 
proteus infection/ or exp serratia infection/ 
28. (enterobacter$ or entero-bacter$ or klebsiella or citro-bact$ or citrobact$ or escherichia or hafnia or 
morganell$ or proteus or serratia or "e coli" or "e.coli").ti,ab,ot. 
29. (kluyvera or providencia or "E.aerogenes" or "e aerogenes" or "k.oxytoca" or "k oxytoca" or "k 




31. 25 and 30 
32. (CPE or CPEs or CRE or CREs or CNSE).ti,ab,ot. 
33. 31 or 32 
34. ((CP or CR) adj2 (enterobacter$ or entero-bacter$)).ti,ab,ot. 
35. 33 or 34 
36. (outbreak or cluster).mp.  
37. (200$ or 201$).ed,dc. or (200$ or 201$).yr. 
38. 35 and 36 and 37 
 
 
Search 2 – Embase, January 2000 to May 2015 
1. carbapenemase/ or carbapenemase$.ti,ab,ot. 
2. ((carbapenem$ or klebsiella) adj3 (produc$ or secret$ or resist$ or emit$ or generat$ or block$ or 
immun$ or antagoni$ or "not susceptib$" or unsusceptib$ or un-susceptib$ or non-suscepti$ or non-
suscepti$)).ti,ab,ot,hw. 
3. (kpc or vim or mbl or oxa or oxacillinase or oxa48 or metallo-beta-lactamase or "metallo-b-lactamase" 
or NDM$).ti,ab,ot. 
4. or/1-3 
5. enterobacteriaceae/ or exp citrobacter/ or exp enterobacter/ or exp escherichia/ or exp hafnia/ or exp 
klebsiella/ or exp kluyvera/ or exp morganella/ or exp proteus/ or exp providencia/ or exp serratia/ 
6. enterobacteriaceae infection/ or exp escherichia coli infection/ or exp klebsiella infection/ or exp 
proteus infection/ or exp serratia infection/ 
7. (enterobacter$ or entero-bacter$ or klebsiella or citro-bact$ or citrobact$ or escherichia or hafnia or 
morganell$ or proteus or serratia or "e coli" or "e.coli").ti,ab,ot. 
8. (kluyvera or providencia or "E.aerogenes" or "e aerogenes" or "k.oxytoca" or "k oxytoca" or "k 
pneumonia$" or "k.pneumonia$" or "e cloacae" or "e.cloacae").ti,ab,ot. 
9. or/5-8 
10. 4 and 9 
11. (CPE or CPEs or CRE or CREs or CNSE).ti,ab,ot. 
12. 10 or 11 
13. ((CP or CR) adj2 (enterobacter$ or entero-bacter$)).ti,ab,ot. 
14. 12 or 13 
15. (200$ or 201$).dd. 
16. 14 and 15 
17. (200$ or 201$).em. 
18. 14 and 17 
19. 16 or 18 
20. (outbreak or cluster).mp.  
21. 19 and 20 
 
 
